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and Code of Criminal Procedure Revision Committees have undertaken
the formidable task of developing precise distinctions between insanity
and incompetency for presentation to the 1971 Texas Legislature."' One
may expect to see (1) terminological changes that reflect the different
problems presented by mental unsoundness, (2) a mandatory preliminary
hearing on incompetency, (3) specific guidelines on jury involvement in
determining incompetency, and (4) the articulation of the various cri-
teria to be used in making each decision.
J. Christopher Bird
The Doctrine of Most Significant Contacts in Texas:
Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc.
In November 1964, an airplane owned by Mustang Aviation crashed in
Colorado, killing the four persons aboard. Three of the passengers were
Texas residents. All were employed by and on a business trip for a Texas
corporation. The aircraft was rented in Texas and had been hangared,
maintained, and licensed in Texas. The only contact the decedents had
with Colorado other than the accident was a one-hour stopover for refuel-
ing and weather information.1
Nevertheless, in the ensuing wrongful death action brought in Texas,
the defendant airline contended that the law of Colorado was applicable
since the accident occurred there and Texas traditionally followed the
rule of lex loci delicti.' The Colorado statute, however, allows a maximum
recovery of only $25,000 for wrongful death. To avoid this limitation
the plaintiffs argued that the lex loci delicti rule should be abandoned in
favor of the emerging doctrine of "most significant contacts." Under the
"most significant contacts" rationale, the law of the jurisdiction with the
most significant relationship with the parties is applied. Thus the doc-
trine, if adopted, would make Texas law applicable to the case."
Refusing to follow plaintiff's suggestion, the trial court applied the Col-
orado limitation on recovery. The court of civil appeals, affirming the trial
court, refused to adopt the "most significant contacts doctrine," and held
that the substantive law of the place of the tort governed,' that the
amount of damages was substantive, and that Colorado limitation on re-
covery must therefore be applied. In reaching this decision, the court rea-
soned that article 4678,' giving Texas citizens the right to maintain an
action in Texas courts for wrongful death occurring in another state or
foreign country, made Colorado law applicable to determine the extent of
57 See note 43 sup,-a.
' Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
2 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS S 379 (1954). The lex loci delicti doctrine provides for
the application of the laws of the state where the injury occurred; J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON TE
CONFLICT OF LAW 1933-34 (1935).
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS S 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1965), which ad-
vocates the application of the "local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with
the occurrence and with the parties."
'TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. arts. 4671-78 (1952). This would allow the plaintiffs to avoid
the Colorado limitation and have an unlimited recovery as provided by Texas Law.
' Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
OTEx. REv. Cry. STAT. ANN. art. 4678 (1952).
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recovery.' Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas. Held, af-
firmed: The doctrine of "most significant contacts" cannot be applied be-
cause to do so would give the Texas wrongful death statute an extrater-
ritorial effect. Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d. 182 (Tex.
1968).
I. THE LAW APPLICABLE TO TORT ACTIONS BROUGHT IN TEXAS
Texas has long followed the doctrine of lex loci delicti in choosing the
law applicable to tort cases.' This has been carried to extremes occasionally.
Where the law' of the place of the tort, the loci delicti, was extremely dis-
similar to that of Texas, the Texas court would decline to adjudicate the
case."
7416 S.W.2d at 63.
" "The law of the place where the cause of action arose, the lex loci delictis, must determine the
nature of the cause of action, and the defenses, if any, available. The case asserted must stand or
fall upon the law." Jones v. Louisiana W. Ry., 243 S.W. 976, 978 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922);
Withers v. Stimmel, 363 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), error ref. n.re.
' The term "law" has been interpreted to mean both the right, or cause of action itself, and the
remedy. In Mexican Nat'l Ry. v. Jackson, 89 Tex. 107, 33 S.W. 857 (1896) the Texas Supreme
Court noted the dissimilarities of Texas and Mexican law in detail. Under Mexican law, the plain-
tiff's -right to recover in a civil action for negligence depended upon a determination of the de-
fendant's criminal liability for the same wrong. If the criminal liability was determined the plaintiff's
remedy was an initial judgment for the amount that his present injury was ascertainable and both
judgments if the injury worsened or recurred. The plaintiff also had a right to recover for injuries
to members of his family occasioned by the tort. The defendant made her payments to the plaintiff
in installments and had a right to have those payments diminished by the extent the plaintiff was
later able to earn a living. The court noted that these rights and the remedies they entailed were
both different from anything known to the laws of Texas. This dissimilarity in both the rights and
the remedies furnished an ample basis for the court to decline to adjudicate the case where the
plaintiff had the alternative of bringing his action in Mexico initially, where these rights and
remedies could be properly determined. The court bolstered this rationale by considering the dis-
ruptive effects which an adjudication of a tort occurring in Mexico might have on trade between
Texas and Mexico as this might in effect subject carriers who conducted such trade to an uncertain
standard of liability.
The court here did state that the refusal to adjudicate the plaintiff's case worked no injustice
upon him because he could still seek redress in the courts of Mexico. But if this were not so, said
the court, the "interests of justice" would require the Texas courts to decide the case to prevent the
plaintiff from being left without a forum, and the concern for the dissimilarity of the laws of
Texas and Mexico and the preservation of good trade relations would have little weight. This result
would still be in conformity with the lex loci delicti doctrine.
The Texas Supreme Court also held in St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry. v. McCormick, 71 Tex. 660, 9
S.W. 540 (1888), that the enforceability of rights in Texas courts extends only so far as they
are similar to those granted in Texas law. The same statement was made in Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
Richards, 68 Tex. 375, 4 S.W. 627 (1887), wherein the court said that the same considerations of
similarity also affected the remedy as well as the right.
Thus the concern of the court regarding the application of dissimilar law pertains to both the
right and the remedy and persists to date. See Garza v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 418 S.W.2d 595
(Tex. Civ. App. 1967). But the potential harsh results of such a refusal where it would leave the
plaintiff without a forum, which would occur in a case like Mexican Nat'l Ry. Co. v. Jackson,
supra, if the defendant corporation was not amenable to litigation in Mexico or any other forum,
was recognized in the Jackson case. Apparently the court could in the interests of justice proceed
to apply even dissimilar law, as the court in Jackson stated, where the plaintiff brought his suit in
Texas as a matter of necessity since he had no other forum and not a choice. This would still be
in conformity with the lex loci delicti doctrine.
"Mexican Nat'l Ry. v. Jackson, 89 Tex. 107, 33 S.W. 857 (1896). There were exceptions to
this rule, however, as evidenced by the case of Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Mitten, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 653,
36 S.W. 282 (1896), error ref. The court in Mitten allowed recovery by the plaintiff in a lump sum
for a tort committed in Mexico, despite the fact that Mexican law was greatly dissimilar to that
of Texas. The court criticized an earlier case, Mexican Nat'l Ry. v. Jackson, 89 Tex. 107, 33 S.W.
857 (1896), which held that Mexican law was so dissimilar to that of Texas that Texas courts could
not adjudicate a claim for a tort occurring in Mexico. The court in Mitten determined that the
state of Texas had such a significant relationship with the occurrence so as to allow the Texas
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The harsh result" of the refusal by Texas courts to adjudicate cases in-
volving dissimilar foreign law has been mitigated to a great extent by
article 4678." Basically, this statute permits citizens of Texas to maintain
actions in Texas courts for torts occurring in other jurisdictions, and to
enforce the remedies provided by the jurisdiction in which the tort occurs.
It is not clear whether the statute is mandatory, but the point was
touched on in Flaiz v. Moore." There the Texas Supreme Court stated in
dicta that the requisite authority for enforcing a cause of action given by
foreign law, even where Texas law provided none, was supplied by article
4678 and that Texas courts could no longer refuse to adjudicate such
suits."' Thus, the doctrine of refusing to adjudicate a claim involving for-
eign law dissimilar to that of Texas may be obsolete.15
II. GENERAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE "MOST SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS"
DOCTRINE
The first major step"' toward adoption of the doctrine of "most signifi-
cant contacts" occurred in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines.' In Kilberg the
court to try the case where a Texas resident was involved. This result was not, however, incom-
patible with the lex loci delicti doctrine in that Mexican law, the law of the place where the tort
occurred, was applied.
" See note 9 supra.
5 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4678 (1952):
Whenever the death or personal injury of a citizen of this State or of the United
States, or of any foreign country having equal treaty right with the United States
on behalf of its citizens, has been . . . caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default
of another in any foreign State or country for which a right to maintain an action
and recover damages thereof is given by the statute or law of such foreign State
or country, such right of action may be enforced in the courts of this State ....
It has been thought until recently, however, that foreign laws must be similar to those of Texas
before they are enforceable in the state. See El Paso & Juarez Faction Co. v. Carruth, 255 S.W. 159
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1923); Carter v. Tillery, 257 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953), error ref.
n.r.e. The potential harsh results of the doctrine of refusal to apply dissimilar law have been ac-
counted for in the case of Mexican Nat'l Ry. v. Jackson, 89 Tex. 107, 33 S.W. 857 (1896)',
and probably- pose no real problem, since the court there said that they would not refuse adjudica-
tion if the harsh results of doing so were actually shown. See note 9 supra.
3 359 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. 1962).
14 id.
" The doctrine has probably never been a hard and fast rule. See note 9 supra.
0 The development of the "most significant contacts" doctrine can arguably be traced to a
dissent in an early Supreme Court case, Slater v. Mexican Nat'l Ry., 194 U.S. 120 (1904), although
the Court did not specifically discuss the doctrine. The majority in Slater determined that the
amount of damages recoverable for a tort occurring in Mexico was substantive and thus controlled
by the law of the locus delicti. This case was referred to in Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc.,
416 S.W.2d 58 (Tea. Civ. App. 1967), as being "at the head of" the line of cases applying the
lex loci delicti doctrine. Id. at 62. This view has been consistently followed by the Texas courts.
Withers v. Stimmel, 363 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), error ref. n.r.e.; Davis v. Gant, 247
S.W. 576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922), error ref. (allowing recovery for mental anguish permitted under
laws of the locus delicti, though such is not allowed in Texas); Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Miller, 128
S.W. 1165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910), error ref.; Thomas v. Western Union Tel. Co., 61 S.W. 501
(Tex. Civ. App. 1901), error ref. "A question of damages pertains to the right, not the remedy
and is not governed by the law of the forum. This is the rule whether the action is based on tort
or contract." 12 TEX. Ju. 2o Conflict of Laws 5 14, at 314 (1960).
Before the Slater decision, the federal courts exhibited a concern over the harshness of strictly
applying the lex loci delicti doctrine. In Reeves v. Shulmeier, 303 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1902), the
court held that for a tort occurring in Oklahoma, the Oklahoma law allowing the wife to sue
without joining her husband, must be applied, and not the Texas law refusing to allow such pro-
cedure because of the community property stature of the recovery. One can speculate as to the
possible influence this approach might have had, if it had persisted, on our state courts, given the
remarkable adherence to the opposite Slater view which actually did occur.
17 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d ;26, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). The court expressly commended
the reasoning in the Slater dissent.
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New York Court of Appeals allowed recovery under a Massachusetts
wrongful death statute for a tort occurring in Massachusetts, but refused
to apply the limitation on the amount of recovery which the Massachu-
setts statute prescribed." However, the Kilberg court did not adopt the
"most significant contacts" doctrine. Instead, it based the decision on New
York's public policy in favor of helping its own citizens. Any intimation
in Kilberg that the measure of damages was procedural rather than sub-
stantive was later disapproved by the New York Court of Appeals," and
the public policy justification remained the principle basis for such deci-
sions."4 Finally, two years after Kilberg, the court expressly adopted the
doctrine of "most significant contacts.""
Other states soon embraced the "most significant contacts" rationale.
For example, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted the doctrine in
Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc.," a case involving the wrongful death act
of Colorado. Thereafter five other states unequivocally recognized the
doctrine of "most significant contacts."" In addition, the doctrine has been
adopted in the Second,"4 Fourth," Fifth," and Seventh Circuits."'
III. "MOST SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS:" SOME THEORETICAL
CONSIDERATIONS.
Generally, cases fall into three categories.' The first is the spurious con-
flict, which arises when only one state has a policy affected by the occur-
rence. Wilcox v. Wilcox is an excellent example of such a conflict."9 There
a husband and wife domiciled in Wisconsin were injured in an auto acci-
dent in Nebraska, and the wife sued the husband in Wisconsin. The hus-
band contended that the Nebraska guest statute, which prevented recov-
ery in any case except one involving gross negligence, should be applied.
" This occurred despite the fact that the adoption of any rule other than lex loci delicti was
flatly rejected in the earlier case of Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918),
wherein the court overruled Wooden v. Western N.Y. & P.R. Co., 126 N.Y. 10, 26 N.E. 1010
(1891). Wooden was a case demonstrating an early recognition by the New York court of the value
of a logical approach to the choice of laws problem in tort litigation, much like that finally ad-
vocated by the "most significant contacts" doctrine.
"Davenport v. Webb, 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962).
,e The constitutionality of such an approach was upheld in a later federal case, Pearson v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1962). This case
involved the same plane crash as litigated in Kilberg. In Pearson the defendant unsuccessfully con-
tended that the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States, U.S. CONST.
art. IV, 5 1, required New York to give effect to the Massachusetts statute.
" Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
"416 Pa. 1,203 A.2d 796 (1964).
23 Iowa, in the case of Fabricius v. Norgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Wisconsin,
in the case of Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965); Minnesota, in the case
of Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d 526 (1966); New Hampshire, in the case of
Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Florida, in the case of Hopkins v. Lockheed
Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967).
"4Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912
(1962).
'McClure v. United States Liner Co., 368 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
: Sequros Tepeyac v. Bostrom, 347 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1965).
a? Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., 342 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965).
'For a discussion of the categories of conflicts in tort, see Note, Wilcox v. Wilcox: The Begin-
nin of a New Approach to Conflict of Laws in Tort Cases, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 913.
"26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
The trial court and the court of appeals agreed. However, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin reversed and, on the basis of the "most significant
contacts" doctrine, applied Wisconsin law. The court reasoned that the
Nebraska law in question was clearly designed to protect Nebraska de-
fendants. The Wisconsin law, which allowed recovery by an injured auto-
mobile guest, was designed to protect Wisconsin plaintiffs. Since both the
plaintiff and defendant were from Wisconsin, the purpose for which the
Nebraska law was created could not be served by its application in this
case. But the purpose for which the Wisconsin law was enacted could be
furthered. In short, Nebraska had no real interest in the situation while
Wisconsin did. The conflict was spurious and Wisconsin law should apply.
The second category is the direct conflict,' which occurs when more
than one state has an interest in applying its law. This would have been
the situation in the Wilcox case if the defendant had been a Nebraska
domiciliary. The third and final category is the erroneous conflict,31 in
which the policy of neither state is affected. This would have been the case
in Wilcox if neither the plaintiff nor the defendant resided in Wisconsin
or Nebraska and the suit was brought in Wisconsin.
The lex loci delicti doctrine seems more logically applicable to the case
of an erroneous conflict. The application of the doctrine in such a case
conflicts with no interest of either state involved. Thus, the element of
certainty in choosing the applicable law which lex loci delicti affords is a
persuasive factor in commending the doctrine. However, in the direct
conflict situation, where both states have an interest in applying their law,
the logical commendations of lex loci delicti decrease. The application of
a certain law by the use of a rigid formula, without taking into account
the interests involved, appears capricious. Here the "most significant con-
tacts" doctrine assumes a new attractiveness and seems to produce a more
just result simply because the applicable law is determined by the gravity
of each state's interest in the parties involved. Whatever its merits in the
other two situations, lex loci delicti seems most unsuited to a spurious con-
flict, where only one state has an interest, because under it the interested
state may or may not be the state whose law is applied. The choice de-
pends upon sheer chance.
IV. MARMON V. MUSTANG AVIATION, INC.
When the foregoing analysis is made in Marmon, the case seems to be a
spurious conflict. Three of the four decedents were Texas residents and al
were employed by a Texas corporation. The fourth decedent, the pilot,
was hired in Texas and worked for a corporation which had its headquar-
ters in Texas. The aircraft was hangared, maintained, and licensed in
Texas. The court of appeals aptly summed up the situation, stating:
"[t]he only connection between the aircraft, its pilot and passengers, with
the state of Colorado was the crash near Kim and a landing in Denver
NOTES1968]
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earlier that day."' Thus, Texas had every interest in assuring a just dis-
position of the case and no interest of Colorado was affected by the con-
troversy. The purpose of the Colorado limitation on recovery for wrong-
ful death-to protect a Colorado defendant from an excessive recovery-
was not served by applying Colorado law, for there was no Colorado de-
fendant. The purpose of the unlimited recovery allowed by Texas law-
securing a just compensation for the injuries of Texas citizens-was not
served, for Texas law was not applied.
The court of civil appeals stated that it was beyond their power to
adopt the doctrine of "most significant contacts" advanced by the appel-
lant. Thus, the decision rested solely with the Supreme Court of Texas.
The court did not follow the reasoning of the court of civil appeals. In-
stead, the supreme court interpreted the central question in Marmon to
be whether the Texas wrongful death statute ' should be given extraterri-
torial effect." The court relied primarily upon Willis v. Missouri Pacific
Ry.," which held that, where a remedy was granted by statute rather than
by common law, the court was without power to give the statute an ex-
traterritorial effect. In addition, because the Texas wrongful death statute"
is silent as to extraterritorial effect, the Marmon court presumed that the
legislature did not intend for the statute to be applied extraterritorially.5 '
Thus the court held that no choice of laws problem existed, and that under
the principle of stare decisis the interpretation of the wrongful death sta-
tute supplied by Willis controlled the case.
A strong dissent by Associate Justice Steakley, joined by Associate Jus-
tices Smith and Greenhill, emphasized the importance of the state's inter-
est in enforcing its public policy to benefit its citizens and felt that the
United States Supreme Court had removed any taint of unconstitutionality
from the "most significant contacts" doctrine. ' The decision in Willis, said
the dissent, should not control in Marmon because of the Supreme Court's
recognition of a state's constitutional interest in protecting its citizens. This
interest should be held superior to considerations limiting a state's power
under the mandate of outmoded cases such as Willis.
V. CONCLUSION
While the doctrine of lex loci delicti has the advantage of supplying
certainty in the choice and application of law, and thus deters forum shop-
'Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 58, 64 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), citing Camp-
bell v. Campbell, 362 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), error dismissed; Clayton v. Clayton,
308 S.W.2d 5$7 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Grand Prize Distrib. Co. v. Gulf Brewing Co., 267
S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Ball v. Gulf States Util. Co., 123 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939).
3T ax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4671 (1952).
"Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968).
8361 Tex. 432 (1884).
"Tx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4671 (1952).
"Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182, 187 (Tex. 1968), citing 50 Am. JuR.
Statutes § 487 (1944).
"Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 1$ (1962): "Where more than one state has sufficiently
substantial contact with the activity in question, the forum state by analysis of the interest pos-
sessed by the state involved, could constitutionally apply to the decision of the case the law of one
or another state having such an interest in the multi-state activity."
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ping, modern developments make the doctrine questionable. The old ar-
gument that it is fair to subject a voluntary visitor to local laws becomes
somewhat hollow when the voluntary entry into a jurisdiction amounts to
no more than an accidental fall in an aircraft. In this situation there is
such an insignificant relationship between the injured party and the place
of the injury that even the desirable advantage of certainty should yield
to considerations reflecting the real interests of the parties concerned.
Texas has moved in this direction by abandoning its prior refusal to ap-
ply the law of lex locus delicti because of its dissimilarity with that of the
forum. Perhaps this signals a recognition that the place of the tort should
not always be the controlling consideration in the adjudication of tort
claims arising outside the forum state.
R. Randall Bridwell
Negligence- Financial Institution's Liability
to Borrower's Customers
Defendant, Great Western Savings and Loan Association, provided most
of the money for a one-hundred-acre housing development in California.
When house buyers suffered economic loss from construction defects, they
sought recovery for the negligence of both the savings and loan association
and its borrower, a corporation capitalized at $5,000 by two men with no
experience in large-scale tract development.' The savings and loan associa-
tion's financial involvement was three-pronged: it purchased the land and
later resold it to its borrower; it made construction loans after the houses
were presold from a model set up. on the tract; and it exercised a right of
first refusal on first trust deed financing for most of the approximately 2 50
house buyers. It could be inferred that the savings and loan association
committed financing before receiving financial statements or customary
feasibility studies from its borrower's inexperienced organizers. The sav-
ings and loan association's involvement further included approval of its
borrower's house plans, which lacked features to compensate for the ex-
pansive nature of the tract's soil. Houses on the tract were heavily dam-
aged,' probably' when soil expansion cracked their foundations. The say-
'The issues at the trial's first phase were: "[1. whether] a principal-agent, joint venture, or
joint enterprise relationship existed between the (two defendants]; [2. if not] whether Great West-
ern had any independent duty to [the house buyers]; and [3] whether Great Western . . . com-
mitted fraud upon which it could be liable." Connor v. Conejo Valley Dev. Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 333,
341 (Ct. App. 1967). The court held against the plaintiffs on the first issue, for them on the sec-
ond, and did not reach the third.
' Details of the land purchase are at 61 Cal. Rptr. at 337-38. The total original acquisition cost
was $340,000, of which the development company put up $190,000, and the savings and loan
association $150,000. Four months later and for $180,000, the borrower took title under an option
from the savings and loan association.
'The houses sold for about $15,000 each, and they were damaged to the extent of about forty
per cent of their value. 61 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
'Since the appeal was from a nonsuit, the court "[disregarded] conflicting evidence, [gave] to
the plaintiff's evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled, and [indulged] in every legiti-
mate inference which may be drawn from that evidence." 61 Cal. Rptr. at 341. The court's lengthy
discussion of the soil indicates its inference of causation.
NOTES1968 ]
